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The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) represents a growing
threat to the national security interests of the United States. The United States must
retain its ability to project power, while providing its forces adequate protection. Military
Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) are becoming a primary responsibility and
mission of the U.S. armed forces. Evidence indicates that WMD are proliferating
precisely in the same regions where U.S. military forces have been called upon to
conduct MOOTW.
While the United States has developed various measures to confront this growing
challenge, most notably the 1993 DoD Counter Proliferation Initiative, additional
considerations must be weighed in assessing the overall effectiveness of the U.S.
counterproliferation strategy. The level of preparedness of the U.S. military is of
particular concern, in ensuring forces are trained, equipped, and prepared to confront
WMD-armed adversaries in a MOOTW environment. This study examines the merging
confluence of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and U.S. military
operations other than war.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) represents a growing
threat to U.S. national security. Despite the overwhelming U.S. conventional military
superiority, several countries are searching for ways to defeat or at least deter U.S.
involvement in regional conflicts. Weapons of mass destruction appear to offer potential
adversaries an appealing, inexpensive, and potentially devastating solution to U.S.
conventional superiority. Termed asymmetric threats, WMD pose a serious challenge to
U.S. military forces.
Two key components of U.S. national military strategy remain the ability to
project power and provide adequate force protection. Specifically, military operations
other than war (MOOTW) are quickly becoming a primary role and responsibility for
U.S. military forces. Ranging from non-combatant evacuations and counter-drug
operations to peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations, MOOTW is
receiving growing attention and accompanied by a dramatically increased devotion of
resources.
Unconventional weapons are proliferating in many of the same regions that
currently require U.S. MOOTW involvement. This merging confluence of WMD
proliferation and MOOTW can no longer be ignored.
While the United States has developed various measures for meeting the growing
challenges presented by WMD proliferation, most notably the 1993 DoD Counter
Proliferation Initiative (CPI), much work remains to be completed if the United States is
serious about its commitment to halt the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical
weapons and their means of delivery. To risk being caught unprepared for a WMD
incident during a MOOTW operation is inviting certain disaster.
Although U.S. non-proliferation efforts have achieved much success, the further
development and implementation of a counterproliferation strategy has become
increasingly necessary. As outlined in the DoD's CPI, current counterproliferation
measures are focused on four areas: prevention, deterrence, rollback, and military force
preparedness. While no single component by itself can guarantee success, employed
together the tenets of the CPI may at least contain global WMD proliferation.
U.S. counterproliferation actions may have far-reaching effects on overall U.S.
national security. The U.S. counterproliferation strategy must be assessed in view of both
its short-term and long-term consequences. Most pressing are the concerns over the U.S.
military's readiness and ability to confront the challenges posed by a WMD-capable
adversary. This thesis suggests the immediate necessity to develop more robust
counterproliferation strategies, while ensuring U.S. military forces are trained, equipped,
and prepared to confront WMD in a MOOTW environment.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND
The proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons presents a
growing threat to U.S. national security. As nations continue to acquire the technology,
expertise, and resources necessary for the development of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD), international instability may increase.
American decision-makers have devised various measures to preserve U.S.
national security interests, while attempting to offer protection to their allies. Among the
various policies and agreements aimed towards preventing the proliferation of WMD,
perhaps the most aggressive and robust measure is the 1993 Department of Defense
(DoD) Counter Proliferation Initiative (CPI). This document contains four primary
components that outline the DoD's strategy for combating the proliferation of WMD: (1)
prevent acquisition; (2) roll back proliferation; (3) deterrence; and, (4) adapt U.S. military
forces and planning considerations.
B. THESIS
This study addresses the U.S. counterproliferation strategy in terms of the DoD's
CPI and in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). To assess the relationship
between the CPI and MOOTW, the thesis identifies empirical evidence that suggests the
growing convergence of these types of operations.
Many scholars as well as military leaders generally agree that MOOTW will
continue to be a dominant aspect of current and future military operations. In the
relatively unstable setting of the post-Cold War international environment, the United
States has found itself conducting MOOTW throughout the world. Involvement ranges
from humanitarian assistance operations in various regions of Africa and South East
Asia, non-combatant evacuations in Albania and Sierra Leone, to large-scale
peacekeeping operations in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia.
The United States enjoys an overwhelming conventional military force
superiority. But its military superiority propels potential adversaries to seek alternative
ways to deter or defeat U.S. forces. It is these alternative solutions - asymmetric threats
- that the United States is most likely to be forced to confront in the near future. It is
only natural to consider that U.S. MOOTW efforts and counterproliferation operations
may become intertwined in the future. As WMD continues to proliferate globally, U.S.
military power projection and force protection capabilities conducted within the
MOOTW arena will be affected.
The National Defense Panel recently reported that weapons of mass destruction
challenge the U.S. ability to project combat power. It is the use, or threat of use of
WMD, which could deter the United States from establishing forward operating areas and
degrade or impede the ability of U.S. military forces from completing their mission. 1
Despite much testimony certifying the primary threat presented by WMD proliferation,
MOOTW doctrine fails to incorporate counterproliferation operations or tactics. This
Report of the National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21 s
Century (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1998), 16.
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thesis demonstrates the need for U.S. MOOTW strategy and doctrine to include
counterproliferation strategy, specifically the tenets of the CPI.
The thesis examines the inherent risks and benefits associated with
counterproliferation activities. Also discussed is how the United States can optimally
apply its counterproliferation strategy to ensure that its power projection and force
protection capabilities are retained, while simultaneously mitigating the risks of conflict
escalation.
The importance of this issue lies in the outcomes of U.S. unilateral actions taken
against specific states or non-state actors attempting to develop or acquire WMD
capabilities stemming from acts of proliferation. The proliferation of WMD is
accelerating. It is critical for U.S. civilian and military officials to understand the
implications of counterproliferation operations. Although the risk of conflict escalation is
omnipresent, the likelihood of confronting WMD threats during future military
operations other than war must be acknowledged. There is a natural relationship between
counterproliferation strategy and MOOTW. This thesis will explore this relationship and
identify the importance of incorporating counterproliferation strategy in MOOTW
doctrine.
C. METHODOLOGY
This paper uses academic research and sourced intelligence, portions of which
have recently been de-classified and made available to the public. While an entirely
unclassified thesis was desired, it would be myopic and naive to ignore the alarming
empirical evidence which currently exists at the classified levels. In an effort to produce
a thesis that can be freely disseminated, unclassified information was used exclusively.
It would be nearly impossible to answer within the scope of this analysis every
conceivable outcome of U.S. force application in counterproliferation operations. It
would be equally difficult to provide a conclusive examination of the entire realm of U.S.
non-proliferation strategy. For this reason, the thesis will focus on the CPI while
examining certain scenarios within the MOOTW arena that are judged to be the most
probable applications of U.S. military force in countering the proliferation ofWMD.
D. ORGANIZATION
The thesis is organized into seven sections. First, the thesis topic is introduced
and a preface is provided to highlight the importance and relevance of associating
MOOTW and CPI strategies. Second, the relatively brief history of preemption and
counterforce operations is discussed to provide an historical context for the current
situation of counterproliferation activities. Third, the concepts contained in the Counter
Proliferation Initiative are defined, while the U.S. counterforce strategy is identified.
Fourth, the legal and moral ramifications of the CPI are discussed to estimate
international reactions to U.S. unilateral counterforce preemptive military actions.
Fifth. U.S. military force structure is examined in terms of its capabilities and
limitations to identify various counterproliferation constraints. Any U.S. military actions
conducted towards counterproliferation objectives would likely be undertaken under the
guidelines and procedures established by Joint Military Operations Other Than War
(MOOTW). Joint doctrine for MOOTW is investigated to identify possible concepts of
operations and potential schemes of maneuver. Prospective applications of military
forces employed towards counterproliferation operations in a MOOTW setting are
discussed. Also examined is the impact on U.S. military forces when confronted with a
potential WMD threat during the conduct of a particular MOOTW mission.
Finally, the conclusion summarizes the thesis and offers a pragmatic appraisal of
future U.S. military actions in enforcing the provisions established within the CPI. Three
appendices also are included which illustrates regions confirmed and/or suspected of
containing one or more forms of WMD. Together with an overview of recent U.S.
MOOTW involvement, trends in WMD proliferation provide a foundation for a fuller
understanding of U.S. counterproliferation strategy.
The goal of this thesis is to highlight the merging confluence of WMD
proliferation and U.S. involvement in MOOTW. Towards this end, the CPI is examined
in terms of its strategic, operational, and tactical application in the U.S. military's
conduct of MOOTW. Today, operating tempos for military operations other than war are
at historically high levels. Equal to this hectic pace is the international proliferation of
WMD. The merging and eventual confrontation of WMD and MOOTW is bound to
occur in the very near future. The U.S. military must be prepared, trained, and equipped
to meet this challenge if the United States is to ensure the preservation and protection of
its national interests, both domestically and abroad.
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II. HISTORY OF COUNTERPROLIFERATION OPERATIONS
A. COUNTERPROLIFERATION AS STRATEGIC THEORY
Counterproliferation provides military options to counter the acquisition and use
of WMD by regional adversaries.2 Some critics contend that counterproliferation
measures undermine other more diplomatic non-proliferation efforts, but DoD officials
stress otherwise. Although the most recent U.S. counterproliferation strategy does
contain a strong emphasis on military options, most notably raising the possibility of
conducting preemptive/preventive attacks against WMD adversaries; counterproliferation
is not intended to replace non-proliferation. 3
While counterproliferation terminology is somewhat of a neologism, its historical
strategic context is not unique. Preemptive military attacks have been a significant part
of the history of warfare. The objective of achieving a strategic advantage through the
employment of tactical surprise remains a primary tenet of modern warfare.
The strategic theory of employing preemptive military attacks against the
proliferation of WMD is a relatively recent development. This preemption strategy is
accompanied by significant moral, legal, and diplomatic considerations that will be
discussed in a following chapter.
" Angus McColl, "Is Counterproliferation Compatible with Nonproliferation." Airpower





The focus within this section centers on five historical examples of military force
being employed to counter the suspected proliferation, acquisition, and/or development of
WMD. The first two examples occurred during a wartime setting, but they involved
deliberate military force devoted towards countering a specific WMD threat. While the
targeting operations in the first two examples may not be preemptive in the purest sense,
the fact remains that deliberate attacks were planned and conducted to eliminate
identified WMD threats.
The final three examples were clear preemptive attacks intended to counter WMD
proliferation that occurred during periods of peace. The conduct of preemptive strikes
against WMD targets during peacetime suggests a willingness to accept the inherent risks
of conflict escalation to neutralize and eliminate potential WMD threats. This "risk
versus gains" argument serves as a central theme of counterproliferation strategy.
Strategic planners and military decision-makers must understand the risks and
benefits associated with preemptive military strikes. Aside from the moral and legal
repercussions, there are other factors that must be considered. Should a preemptive strike
against a particular WMD target fail, or is less than 100 percent successful, the
possibilities and dangers of counter-attacks or reprisal actions may outweigh the original
assessed risks posed by the presence of the respective weapon of mass destruction. The
risks versus gains argument is especially applicable in the MOOTW environment because
U.S. military forces are expected to operate in dynamic settings and can expect to
confront a multitude of challenges.
B. WORLD WAR II
During World War II Germany was suspected of manufacturing chemical and
biological weapons for use against allied forces. Allied intelligence efforts also
suggested that German scientists were developing the A-bomb. The allied strategic
bombing campaign included the deliberate targeting and destruction of German factories
suspected of developing these weapons of mass destruction. Despite the tremendous
amount of ordinance devoted towards this objective, the allied bombing campaign failed
to destroy the German nuclear research effort. More important to the counter-WMD
effort was the destruction of the Norwegian heavy-water production plant that was
required for the German nuclear production.4 Barry R. Schneider claims that the allies
were able to prevent Germany from completing the development of their A-bomb,
thereby saving the lives of millions of allied servicemen, not to mention preventing
massive collateral damage and civilian casualties. The continued strategic bombing
campaigns against Germany, as well as the sabotage efforts in Norway, were the first
antinuclcar counterforce operations in history.
5
While the Allied attacks against suspected German WMD sites cannot be
considered preemptive, it certainly qualifies as forceful military actions aimed at
countering the obvious lethal effects of WMD. The strategic objective of eliminating or
at least neutralizing German WMD capabilities continues to serve as a legitimizing factor
and historical precedent for counterproliferation operations.
4
For a complete discussion of the allied counter-WMD efforts against Germany during WWII, see
Gardner and Waller in 1943 and 199], which offers a thorough insight into German WMD production and
the allied counter-WMD strategy.
5
Barry R. Schneider, Future War and Counterproliferation (Westport: Praeger, 1999), 150.
Also during World War II, Japanese nuclear laboratories in Tokyo were
specifically targeted by allied bombing planners to eliminate the threat of a Japanese
nuclear weapons program. By early 1945, U.S. bombs had destroyed nearly the entire
Japanese nuclear infrastructure; thereby terminating Japan's most advanced nuclear
research project.6 As a testament to the nascent but growing threat of international
proliferation ofWMD science and technology, Schneider notes that some evidence exists
identifying German and Japanese cooperation towards missile and radiological weapons. 7
C. PERSIAN GULF WAR: 1991
Another example of military actions directed against an adversary's suspected
WMD capabilities occurred during Desert Shield/Desert Storm. The U.S.-led coalition
specifically sought out Iraqi WMD sites to destroy and eliminate this threat. The
coalition conducted approximately 970 air strikes against nuclear, biological, and
chemical targets. 8 Although the United States was criticized for inflicting civilian
casualties and causing collateral damage in targeting these particular objectives, Iraq
failed to employ any weapons within its WMD arsenal.
It is difficult to determine whether it was the direct result of the allied attacks
against identified Iraqi WMD sites or if the threat of nuclear retaliation forced Iraq to
withhold from employing WMD. It may be the United States adoption of a "purposeful
ambiguous" strategy, deliberately not ruling out the possibility of employing its arsenal
Geoffrey Brooks, Hitler's Nuclear Weapons: The Development and Attempted Deployment of
Radiological Armaments by Nazi Germany (London: Leo Cooper, 1992), 191.
7




of nuclear weapons in response to Iraqi NBC attacks. For certain, the United States could
not rely on the tradition of nuclear diplomacy and its deterrence value alone to ensure that
Iraq did not use its WMD capabilities against the allied forces in Desert Shield/Desert
Storm. Considering Iraq's unwillingness or more probably its inability to deploy its
arsenal ofWMD, the allied coalition appears justified in its goals.
Despite the tremendous amount of ordinance expended on targeting suspected
Iraqi WMD sites, post-war inspections concluded that the allied bombing effort was at
best marginal in neutralizing Iraq's WMD capabilities. But this thesis is not concerned
with statistical data results of effectiveness, but rather the particular aspect and strategy of
military forces being devoted towards counter WMD operations. What becomes very
clear is the U.S. assessment of the threat posed by Iraq's WMD capabilities. Whether or
not one can consider allied actions during Desert Shield/Desert Storm as preemptive is
not important. Similar to allied actions against Germany during WWII, the application of
military force specifically directed towards countering an opponent's (in this case Iraq)
WMD capabilities indicates a strategic and operational trend in force protection and
targeting, commonly referred to as counterforce operations.
The attacks against German and Iraqi WMD sites occurred during the wartime
settings of the Second World War and the Persian Gulf War, which mitigates some of the
risks of further conflict escalation. The ability to ignore risks of conflict escalation is at
best a rare luxury, and as the next three examples illustrate, consideration of risks
dominates political decision-making. Weighing the expected gains versus potential risks
will remain prevalent in future decisions to employ military forces against proliferation
11
efforts. The following three examples of preemptive military operations targeting WMD
occurred during peacetime, which may foreshadow things to come.
D. OSIRAK: 1981
The Israeli decision to launch a preemptive military strike in June 1981 against
the Iraqi Osirak nuclear reactor is the first example of military force being applied to
counter a WMD threat during peacetime. This successful attack, resulting in the
destruction of the Iraqi nuclear reactor, was preceded by an unsuccessful Iranian attack in
September 1980 against the same reactor during the Iran-Iraq War. Although the Israeli
attack derailed the Iraqi nuclear program, the strategic importance of that attack would
not be fully realized until 1991. Had it not been for the Israeli preemptive attack it is
likely that Iraq would have had a nuclear weapon arsenal by the time of the Persian Gulf
War.9
While the risks of initiating a full-scale war with Iraq affected Israeli decision-
making, it was the assessed threat of the prospect of an Iraqi nuclear capability that
influenced the ultimate decision to launch a preemptive strike. Any Arab effort to
develop or acquire nuclear weapons was regarded as a "casus belli;" thereby supporting
military preemption. 10 Politics clearly played a significant part in influencing the Israeli
decision; however, the future risks of confronting a nuclear weapon-armed regional
adversary vastly outweighed the risks of complacent inaction.
Barry R. Schneider, Future War and Counterproliferation (Westport: Praeger, 1999), 152.
10 Avner Cohen, "The Lessons of Osirak and the American Counterproliferation Debate," in
International Perspectives on Counterproliferation, Working Paper No. 99, eds. Mitchell Reiss and Harald
Muller, (January 1995), 80.
12
Israel justified its preemptive attack citing "anticipatory self-defense." 11 Israel's
attempt to establish its moral and legal legitimacy for the attack was met with
international condemnation, although the U.S. response was restrained. The lessons of
Osirak are significant in that the preemptive attack serves as a precedent for
counterproliferation strategy and operations involving military force. Aside from a direct
threat of a WMD attack on the American homeland, it will be difficult for the United
States to establish justification for preemptive attacks aimed at thwarting proliferation
through citing anticipatory self-defense as in the Israeli case.
E. SUDAN: 1998
Another example of military force employed to counter the proliferation ofWMD
is the U.S. attack against Sudan in August 1998. U.S. intelligence sources revealed the
Sudanese were developing a biological and chemical weapons capability at the al-Shifa
pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum. Intelligence also indicated that the Sudanese WMD
developments were the direct result of proliferate actions, sponsored by the Osama bin
Laden terrorist organization. U.S. officials stated that the bombing of the Sudanese
facility "was necessary to prevent bin Laden from acquiring deadly nerve gas precursors
that were being produced [at al Shifa]." 12 Together with near simultaneous attacks
against a terrorist training complex in eastern Afghanistan, the U.S. Navy launched
" Ibid., 87.
12
Michael Barletta, "Chemical Weapons in the Sudan: Allegations and Evidence," The
Nonproliferation Review (Fall 1998): 115.
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between 75 and 80 Tomahawk cruise missiles intended to destroy the suspected terrorist
and WMD targets. 13
The U.S. attacks against the sites in Sudan and Afghanistan occurred shortly after
terrorists bombed two American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The American
retaliation attacks against these particular targets suggest a similar relationship between
counterproliferation and counterterrorism strategies. The proliferation of WMD enables
both state and non-state actors (i.e. terrorists) to present a greatly increased threat to U.S.
national security interests. Due to their relatively inexpensive costs and low technological
requirements, chemical and biological weapons appeal to those in search of asymmetric
advantages.
14
Weapons of mass destruction allow conventionally weak states and non-state
actors to counter and possibly thwart America's overwhelming conventional
superiority.
15
If the United States is to protect its national security interests while
preserving its power projection and force protection capabilities, countering the
proliferation ofWMD is a critical strategic objective.
F. DESERT FOX: 1998
In December 1998, the United States conducted a series of military strikes against
suspected Iraqi WMD sites during operation Desert Fox. This operation serves as the
most recent example of the United States using force as an element of its
14
H. Allen Holmes, "Looking into DoD's Geopolitical Future" Defense Viewpoint Volume 10,
Number 74. Online at [http://defenselink.mil/speeches/1995/dil074.html].
14
counterproliferation strategy in peacetime. Over a period of 70 hours U.S. fighter aircraft
conducted more than 650 strike sorties, while Air Force B-52 bombers dropped
approximately 90 cruise missiles. 16 Additionally, the U.S. Navy launched more than 325
precision-guided Tomahawk cruise missiles, each costing nearly $1 million and
delivering a high-explosive yield of 1000 pounds. 17 Following the successful attack,
Secretary of Defense Cohen stated that "we've diminished [Iraq's] ability to deliver
chemical and biological weapons." The Desert Fox operation is further testament to the
American resolve to counter the proliferation of WMD, particularly among nations that
are considered hostile, dangerous, and pose a threat to U.S. national security interests.
Certainly, the attacks against Iraqi and Sudanese WMD targets can be considered
forceful testaments to the American concern and resolve towards the international
proliferation of WMD. Although the United States would later admit with some
reluctance to the possibility that it erred in its attack against Sudan, the U.S. military
action clearly was a direct reflection of its counterproliferation strategy as outlined in the
1993 Counter Proliferation Initiative (CPI) discussed in detail during the following
section. As the analysis of the CPI will demonstrate, the United States estimates its
greatest threat to be posed by the increased proliferation of WMD. As "rogue" states
continue to pursue and develop the capability to employ WMD against critical U.S.
national interests and security, the U.S. power projection and force protection capabilities
will be degraded.
|v
Report of the National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21
s'
Century (Washington. D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1998), 16.
16
Linda D. Kozaryn, "Four Nights; 100 Targets," American Forces Press Service. Online at
[http://defenselink.mil/news/Decl998/nl2211998_9812212.html].
,7
Linda D. Kozaryn, "Four Nights; 100 Targets," American Forces Press Service. Online at
[http://defenselink.mil/news/Decl998/nl2211998_9812212.html].
15
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III. THE U.S. DOD COUNTER PROLIFERATION INITIATIVE
A. ORIGINS OF THE CPI
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction provokes regional instability
and presents significant challenges to the interests of the United States.
18 The United
States is an international leader in developing and sustaining global norms and standards
against the proliferation of WMD. The Department of Defense (DoD) states that the
United States is actively engaged in dialogues with several states to persuade them not to
acquire these capabilities or to eliminate capabilities they might have already developed.
The United States also is working with other nations to combat proliferation by assisting
them in gaining and assuring greater control over their dual-use equipment and
technology.
19
States that gain weapons of mass destruction are able to pose significant military
threats to the interests of the United States and its allies. The growing pervasiveness of
the threat posed by proliferating WMD prompted President Clinton to proclaim to the
United Nations in September 1993 that, "If we do not stem the proliferation of the
world's deadliest weapons, no democracy can feel secure."20
The United States began to shift its policy against the development and
production of weapons of mass destruction from a nonproliferation stance toward a more
18
U.S., Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, (Washington D.C.:





N. Lewis and W. Happer, "Counter Proliferation" The MITRE Corporation (January 1998): 3.
-17-
forceful counterproliferation strategy. This transition was prompted by a number of
factors.
First, some of the lessons learned from the Persian Gulf War demonstrated U.S.
vulnerability and inability to locate, identify, and destroy Iraq's well-developed and
protected chemical and biological weapons architecture. Had Iraq employed its arsenal
ofWMD, the U.S.-led coalition surely would not have enjoyed its relatively easy victory.
The second instrument used to shape and implement U.S. counterproliferation
strategy was the 1993 Bottom-Up Review that identified post-Cold War military
requirements. With the collapse of communism and the subsequent break-up of the
Soviet Union, the primary threat facing the United States during the Cold War was gone.
In response to new threats, the United States needed to restructure its military to cope
with new challenges.
As the relatively stable bipolar world of the Cold War gave way to the
increasingly unstable multipolar international environment of today, new and potentially
more dangerous threats have emerged. The United States has determined that the
principle threat of this period continues to be the proliferation of WMD. Figure 1
illustrates the proliferation of WMD since the Second World War. Despite a near
opprobrium on nuclear and biological weapons, the proliferation of these types ofWMD
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Figure 1. Proliferation ofWMD* Since World War II
To counter this threat, in 1993 the DoD developed the Counter Proliferation
Initiative (CPI). Specific objectives of the Counter Proliferation Initiative are to: (1)
prevent the acquisition of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons and their
delivery systems; (2) roll back proliferation where it has occurred; (3) deter the use of
NBC weapons and their delivery systems; and (4) adapt U.S. military forces and planning
to respond to regional contingencies in which U.S., allied, and coalition forces face NBC
threats.
21
* WMD is defined as "weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction and/or being used in
such a manner as to destroy large numbers of people." WMD usually refers to nuclear, biological, and
chemical (NBC) weapons. Department of Defense, Department ofDefense Dictionary ofMilitary and
Associated Terms (Washington D.C.: GPO, 23 March 1994), 412.
** WMD capable states are defined as states that are confirmed or highly probable of possessing
one or more forms of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons according to open source literature..
Excluded in these figures are states such as Libra, Syria, Iraq, and others that are suspected of pursuing or
development WMD.
21
U.S., Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, (Washington D.C.:
Government Printing Office, April 1996). Online at [http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/prolif/response.html
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B. PREVENT ACQUISITION
A 1997 National Defense Research Institute paper sponsored by RAND stated
that preventing the spread of NBC weapons constitutes the main goal of
nonproliferation.
22
It is axiomatic to conclude that if nonproliferation efforts were one
hundred per cent effective, a counterproliferation strategy would be irrelevant. Despite
continued nonproliferation efforts, a counterproliferation strategy has become
increasingly necessary. Table 1 depicts the broad array of nations that are known, or in
some cases suspected, of possessing various forms of weapons of mass destruction. At
least thirty countries fall into this category of WMD-capable states.
But the perception that preventing acquisition of WMD appears to be a losing
battle is not to suggest that U.S. decision-makers have abandoned efforts towards this
objective. A number of U.S. sponsored programs and activities are designed and
committed to preventing acquisition of WMD science and technologies. Efforts such as
the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, which is designed to provide funds and
technical expertise in assisting a number of former Soviet Union republics in dismantling
and destroying WMD arsenals, prevents potential proliferation ofWMD.
The Wassenaar Arrangement announced in December 1995 provided an
international regime to "increase transparency and responsibility of trade in conventional
arms and dual-use goods and technology."23 Since enforcement is voluntary, much
criticism has been levied against the agreement's effectiveness at preventing WMD
proliferation. But similar to other multilateral programs designed to impede proliferation,
22 Gregory F, Treverton and Bruce W. Bennett, "Integrating Counterproliferation into Defense
Planning," RAND Defense Issues, 4. Online at [http://www.rand.org/publications/CF/CF132/].
23
Robert W. Chandler, The New Face of War (McLean, Virginia: AMCODA Press, 1998), 105.
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the Wassenaar Arrangement has failed to meet expectations mainly due to its inability to
enforce compliance with non-proliferation standards.
Table 1. Countries Possessing One or More Forms ofWMD
WEAPON OF MASS DESTRUCTION
COUNTRY NUCLEAR BIOLOGICAL CHEMICAL
Afghanistan U U P
Argentina Suspended N N
Belarus N N N
Brazil Suspended N N
Burma N N P
Chile N N S
China C P P
Cuba N N s
Egypt N S p
Ethiopia N P p
France C Destroyed s
India C P N
Iran s P c
Iraq s S c
Israel p N p
Kazakhstan N N p
Libya s S s
North Korea p P p
Pakistan c P s
Russia c c c
Somalia N N s
South Africa Suspended Suspended N
South Korea Suspended N s
Syria N P N
Taiwan Suspended P P
Thailand N N S
Ukraine N N P
United Kingdom C Destroyed N
United States C Destroyed C







Source: John M. Collins, Zachary S. Davis, and Steven R. Bowman, Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
Weapon Proliferation: Potential Military Countermeasures, Congressional Research Service report for
Congress, The Library of Congress, 28 June 1994, 2.
The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) originally established in 1968 and which
entered into force in 1970 was aimed at arresting the spread of nuclear weapons beyond
21-
the established five nuclear powers.
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Recently 186 nations signed the NPT, indefinitely
agreeing to restrict the right to maintain nuclear weapons to the "big five" - Britain,
China, France, Russia, and the United States. The NPT helps to maintain the status quo,
thereby ensuring international stability. Stability is achieved by preventing less-than-
great powers from obtaining nuclear weapons and potentially using or threatening to use
their weapons as bargaining chips in order to elicit concessions from the "big five."2'
Preventing the acquisition of WMD continues to be a primary goal of U.S.
counterproliferation strategy. But it also is recognized that efforts towards preventing
countries from acquiring WMD capabilities will not be one hundred per cent effective as
current evidence indicates. Overall, U.S. efforts to prevent acquisition through its non-
proliferation strategy have achieved some positive results. Only four countries (India,
Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea) have developed nuclear weapons outside of the non-
proliferation regime. Unfortunately, stemming the proliferation of other forms of WMD,
namely chemical and biological weapons, has not met with the same success. Additional
measures must be taken to reinforce and augment the U.S. goal of containing and
eliminating WMD proliferation.
C. ROLL BACK PROLIFERATION
In cases where preventing acquisition of weapons of mass destruction has failed,
direct offensive measures may be undertaken. Rolling back WMD proliferation where it
24
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has already occurred represents an important element of the U.S. counterproliferation
strategy. Rollback consists of both voluntary and involuntary measures designed to
destroy existing WMD capabilities. Cases such as Sweden, Taiwan, South Korea, South
Africa, Brazil, and Argentina as well as the former Soviet Republics of Kazakhstan,
Belarus, and Ukraine, all voluntarily and peacefully decided to terminate their nuclear
weapons programs and eliminate existing nuclear weapon arsenals. Although financial
incentives and other economic factors motivated their decisions, bilateral and multilateral
diplomacy played a large role in rolling back these WMD programs.
To this point, there have been only two instances of states being involuntarily
forced to roll back their WMD programs - World War II Nazi Germany and present day
Iraq. Numerous others have been involuntarily restrained through the application of trade
sanctions, embargoes, and other forms of export controls designed to prevent further
WMD proliferation.
Peaceful diplomacy will continue to serve a primary role in U.S. non-proliferation
efforts, but a counterproliferation strategy allows the United States the flexibility to adopt
a more offensive and proactive stance in combating the proliferation of WMD when
diplomacy and other more peaceful means fail. Forcefully rolling back proliferation
where it has already occurred is the most controversial aspect of the U.S. CPI. Whenever
military force is applied to achieve a decisive solution outside of a wartime context,
concerns of legitimacy and justification will surface. Following its most recent attacks
against the suspected WMD sites in the Sudan, the United States witnessed international
condemnation for its perceived eagerness to use military force.
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Rolling back proliferation as the second component of the CPI is closely linked to
the other aspects of U.S. counterproliferation strategy. If the United States consistently
demonstrates its willingness to use force when necessary in preventing WMD from
proliferating, countries that might be contemplating pursuing a WMD program may be
deterred from acquiring unconventional weapons.
D. DETERRENCE
The third core objective in the counterproliferation policy is to convince potential
and actual proliferants that NBC weapons will be of no value because the United States
and its allies have the capability to deny or limit the political and military utility of
WMD. In an article sponsored by the National Defense University, Mitchell Wallerstein
argues that a key to deterring the use of [nuclear], biological or chemical weapons lies in
developing counterproliferation capabilities that negate the value of using WMD against
U.S. or allied forces.
26
Deterrence is simply a product of capability and credibility. In
other words, deterrence will succeed if the expected costs of punishment multiplied by
the estimated probability that the deterrent threat will be implemented exceed the
expected gains from the aggression. 27
Deterrence capabilities also may consist of both active and passive measures, such
as individual protective gear, sensors and detection instruments, and other equipment
designed to reduce the effectiveness of WMD. A 1997 RAND paper noted that passive
defense capabilities consist of four primary measures: (1) individual and collective
Strategic Forum Number 138 (May 1998). Online at [http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/foruml38.html].
27
Scott D. Sagan, "The Commitment Trap," International Security 24:4 (Spring 2000), 97.
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protection; (2) medical treatment; (3) facility and equipment protection; and (4)
decontamination. 28 A synergy of these four elements may provide an effective deterrent
against potential threats. This concept of adequately preparing, equipping, and training
U.S. military forces to withstand a WMD attack can be categorized under the rubric of
deterrence, since opponents capable of employing WMD against U.S. forces may be
deterred from actually using their WMD arsenal. In this case, deterrence may result from
the increased readiness and preparedness of U.S. military forces to continue to operate
after being attacked by unconventional weapons.
Additionally, the awareness of the damage inflicted by U.S. and coalition forces
in response to a WMD attack may far outweigh any potential benefits of its use in the
perception of U.S. opponents. It is within this category of counterproliferation, which
calls for offensive actions, and in certain cases, preemption, that deterrence is given
special meaning.
In the case of the Gulf War, it was the U.S. strategy of "calculated ambiguity"
which possibly provided the greatest deterrent against Iraq's arsenal of WMD. By
implicitly threatening to employ nuclear weapons in response to Iraqi chemical and/or
biological attacks, the United States significantly influenced Saddam Hussein's costs
versus benefits calculus for utilizing WMD. Iraq's perception that U.S. forces were
better prepared and equipped to operate in a chemical/biological environment also may
have served to deter Iraq from employing WMD. Whatever the reason for deterrence,
28 Gregory F, Treverton and Bruce W. Bennett, "Integrating Counterproliferation into Defense
Planning," RAND Defense Issues, 7. Online at [http://www.rand.org/publications/CF/CF132/].
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evidence suggests Hussein assessed the expected gains from employing chemical and/or
biological weapons were far outweighed by the expected costs of U.S. retaliation. 29
This example of deterrence has obvious implications in counterproliferation
strategy. If the United States can convince would-be proliferators that the costs incurred
as a result of acquiring some form of WMD outweigh any expected gains, global WMD
proliferation should recede. In addition to retaining a policy of "deliberate ambiguity,"
robust active and passive defensive measures should be undertaken. 30 Moreover, as Paul
Bernstein and Lewis Dunn point out, by preparing to severely punish the next use of
chemical and/or biological weapons, proliferators may ultimately be deterred from
pursuing development and acquisition of aWMD capability.
Many countries that have acquired or are pursuing WMD are seeking to overcome
a conventional force imbalance. In some cases, it is the United States conventional
military force superiority that motivates these states to seek WMD. Through WMD these
"niche states" are able to pose a credible threat to U.S. interests, whereby the United
States conventional military force superiority is mitigated. 31 In these instances, WMD is
viewed as a deterrent, aimed at preventing or limiting U.S. involvement. Whether these
countries are seeking to threaten a regional adversary or deter the United States from
involvement is not immediately important. What is paramount is how the United States
responds.
29
Scott D. Sagan, "The Commitment Trap," International Security 24:4 (Spring 2000), 91-92.
30
Paul I. Bernstein and Lewis A. Dunn, "Adapting Deterrence to the WMD Threat," in
Countering the Proliferation and Use Of Weapons ofMass Destruction, eds. Peter L. Hays, Vincent J.
Jodoin, and Alan R. Van Tassel (New York: McGraw Hill, Inc, 1998), 159-162.
31
Stuart E. Johnson, ed. The Niche Threat: Deterring the Use of Chemical and Biological
Weapons (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1997), 44.
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E. ADAPT U.S. MILITARY FORCES AND PLANNING
CONSIDERATIONS
The May 1997 Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) noted that the
DoD is "developing an integrated counter-NBC weapons strategy that includes both
offensive and defensive measures as well as regular individual, unit, joint, and combined
training and exercises that incorporate realistic NBC threats."32 To ensure future
preparedness to meet challenges brought on by WMD proliferation, according to the
QDR, the DoD must "institutionalize counterproliferation as an organizing principle in
every facet of military activity."
33
Much recent discussion has been devoted to examining the U.S. military force
structure's capability to operate in a WMD environment. Should proliferation of nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons continue at its current pace, the likelihood of U.S.
military forces being confronted with this threat also will increase. Although efforts such
as the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention and the 1997 Chemical Weapons
Convention explicitly bans the possession and use of biological and chemical weapons
through international law, they contain no mechanisms for enforcement of compliance. 34
Because of the dual-use nature of many biological and chemical weapon-related
activities, it is relatively easy to conceal their development and production. Post-war
inspections conducted in Iraq following Desert Shield/Desert Storm revealed vast
quantities of chemical and biological weapon stockpiles supported by a technologically
32
U.S., Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, (Washington D.C.:
Government Printing Office, November 1997). Online at [http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ns00097.pdf].
33
Ibid.
34 Wolfkang K.H. Panofsky, "Dismantling the Concept of "Weapons of Mass Destruction', " Arms
Control Today (April 1998). Online at [http://armscontrol.org/ACT/april98/wkhp98.htm]
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advanced infrastructure. 35 In fact, there are numerous indications that the Iraqi regime
continues to conceal and pursue WMD capabilities and related delivery systems. 36
These facts highlight the immediate need to adapt and prepare U.S. military forces
to meet this growing challenge. The conventional superiority of U.S. military forces as
demonstrated against Iraq during Desert Shield/Desert Storm cannot be assumed in future
conflicts with WMD-armed adversaries. Biological and chemical weapons are the "poor
man's nuclear weapons." Their lethality and destructive power are relatively unknown
since biological weapons have not been used extensively this century in warfare, while
chemical weapons were employed infrequently since World War I. 37 Moreover,
biological and chemical weapons continue to evoke a sense of terror because they
produce indiscriminate destruction. All U.S. military forces should be properly trained
and equipped to ensure they retain their operational capabilities even when attacked with
WMD.
35
Robert W. Chandler, Tomorrow's War, Today's Decisions, (McLean, Virginia, AMCODA
Press, 1996), 18.
36 Greg Weaver and J. David Glaes, Inviting Disaster: How Weapons ofMass Destruction
Undermine U.S. Strategyfor Projecting Military Power (McLean, Virginia: AMCODA Press, 1997), 14.
37 Wolfkang K.H. Panofsky, "Dismantling the Concept of 'Weapons of Mass Destruction', "An
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IV. IMPLICATIONS OF U.S. MILITARY FORCE EMPLOYMENT
TOWARDS COUNTERPROLIFERATION
A. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE
This section evaluates international responses to U.S. counterproliferation efforts
during unilateral and combined operations. The last fifty years of U.S. military
involvement in regional contingency operations has been marked by a heavy emphasis on
coalition warfare, which was most notably demonstrated during Desert Shield/Desert
Storm. Additionally, most military operations other than war (MOOTW) are composed
of multinational forces oriented towards achieving a common objective, although the two
most recent U.S. military counterproliferation actions were unilateral operations.
The international response following the U.S. attacks on a suspected terrorist site
in Afghanistan and a chemical weapons-producing facility in Sudan was not supportive.
Should the United States continue to pursue a unilateral approach to counterproliferation
through employing military force, a hostile international response may be provoked. U.S.
policymakers must weigh the possibility of a negative response to future
counterproliferation operations.
The acceptability of counter-proliferation measures may depend on whether they
are conducted unilaterally or multilaterally. 38 This aspect of unilateral versus multilateral
operations in pursuit of counterproliferation objectives is paramount for predicting
international responses. In fact, the international community would likely condemn any
Counter-Proliferation Strategy. (Newport: Naval War College, 1997) ,11.
29
unilateral counterproliferation effort involving U.S. military forces for which the United
States does not have U.N. authorization. 39 For example, following the U.S. attacks on the
terrorist facility in Afghanistan and on the suspected WMD plant in the Sudan, the United
States was harshly criticized for its apparent haste to use military force.
The international community is aware of the grave dangers posed by WMD
proliferation. Although the U.S. CPI was not met with enthusiasm by numerous
European and Asian allies, a number of countries have begun to embrace the strategy, as
well as develop counterproliferation measures of their own. But a general consensus has
not been met on exactly how to respond to proliferation offenders. While there are some
advocates for the use of military force, the preponderance of states prefer to rely on
diplomatic efforts.
The United States has the option of ignoring international responses to its
counterproliferation strategy. The consequences of this are far-reaching, to include
undermining the existing non-proliferation regime. To be effective, U.S.
counterproliferation efforts must include international support.
By helping to create an international norm condemning WMD proliferation, while
fostering support for specific counterproliferation measures, the United States can avoid
the "ire of the international community."40 This is especially important in
counterproliferation initiatives undertaken during MOOTW, which require a permissive
environment enhanced by host-nation support.




It is likely the international community's response to U.S. counterproliferation
efforts will be based on United Nation mandates and international law. Despite its
peace-promoting and security-enhancing goals, U.S. counterproliferation efforts
conducted unilaterally seem incompatible with current international law.
B. LEGAL AND MORAL RAMIFICATIONS
The legal and moral implications of U.S. counterproliferation operations
involving the application of military force are difficult to assess. This analysis uses two
documents to provide a framework for establishing legal legitimacy in utilizing military
force to counter the proliferation ofWMD: the U.N. Charter and the Geneva Convention.
International law condemns intervention. Article 2(4) of the U.N Charter states
"...all members shall refrain ...from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state...."41 Protection of one's sovereignty is a
vital interest to the survival of any state. For the United States to impose its
counterproliferation objectives on another nation without first receiving U.N.
authorization appears to violate the target country's sovereignty. While the United States
is vulnerable to accusations of hegemonious intentions, particularly with regard to its
counterproliferation strategy, it supports its policies with another provision of the U.N.
Charter.
Article 5 1 of the U.N. Charter asserts the right of nations to engage in anticipatory
self-defense.
42
This inherent right of self-defense continues to be intensely debated, as
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the intended meaning of Article 51 is contested through varying interpretations. In 1986
Secretary of State George Schultz stated that nations are reserved the right to be
"permitted to use force to preempt future attacks, to seize terrorists, or to rescue its
citizens when no other means are available."43 The CPI is seen to incorporate this theme.
U.S. counterproliferation policy can accommodate international law.
Counterproliferation emphasizes the familiar tenets of prevention and deterrence, which
encourage non-proliferation norm-building. Counterproliferation efforts also focus on
preparing and readying military forces for operating in a WMD environment, through
both active and passive defensive measures. None of these aspects violate existing
international laws. But the fourth component of U.S. counterproliferation strategy -
rollback - specifically involuntary rollback, remains the most controversial with respect
to international law.
Involuntary rollback options, particularly preemptive actions, should be
considered only as a last resort and only then with U.N. Security Council approval. The
United States must be careful to avoid violating international laws, even if its intentions
are considered in the interest of promoting peace and stability. Without U.N. support, the
United States risks international condemnation as well as undermining its non-
proliferation goals. The sovereignty of other nations, even the sovereignty of blatant
proliferants, needs to be respected. Non-military means should be used in all but the
most criminal cases ofWMD proliferation in pursuing U.S. counterproliferation policy.44
Counter-Proliferation Strategy. (Newport: Naval War College, 1997), 27.
44
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Counter-Proliferation (Washington D.C.: National Defense University, 1995), 37.
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The United States should continue to develop the tactics, techniques, and
procedures necessary for conducting counterproliferation operations involving military
forces in the event deterrence and prevention measures fail. Should the non-proliferation
regime collapse, the United States must be prepared to protect its national security
interests. Through carefully constructed diplomatic efforts, the U.N. charter can be used
to support future counterproliferation operations involving military options should force
be necessary. A forceful approach to counterproliferation may offer an effective solution
to WMD proliferation.
C. FORCE STRUCTURE CONSIDERATIONS
To evaluate the U.S. military's ability to conduct counterproliferation operations,
four general factors must be considered. First, joint and service doctrine is evaluated to
determine the level of awareness and understanding of counterproliferation operations as
reflected in military doctrine. Second, basic organic capabilities and limitations must be
assessed to provide an overview of possible employment scenarios involving U.S.
military forces. Third, preventive and preemptive operations are examined in terms of
operational considerations as well as the strategic consequences resulting from force
application. Finally, U.S. assurances of power projection and force protection are
discussed to assess likely risks versus benefits calculations when deciding whether or not
to apply a forceful approach to stopping the spread ofWMD.
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1. Military Doctrine
Doctrine is defined as "fundamental principles by which the military forces or
elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives."45 Considering the
stated U.S. counterproliferation policies, one would expect to find correspondingly
similar emphases within existing military doctrine. Additionally, since the proliferation
of WMD has been repeatedly identified as the primary threat to U.S. national security
interests,
46
it would be reasonable to assume that the U.S. military's priorities (as codified
in its doctrine) reflect this priority. From an operational and tactical perspective, one also
would not expect to find the U.S. military conducting operations that are not explicitly
outlined in its doctrine.
Typically, new operational guidelines to the military are issued via Presidential
Decision Directives (PDD's). PDD's tend to be classified, thereby restricting their
distribution. In November 1997, President Clinton issued a PDD establishing new
guidelines to the military on targeting nuclear weapons. According the Hans Kristensen,
the PDD "allows for the use of nuclear weapons against 'rogue' states - those suspected
of having access to weapons of mass destruction."47
Although PDD's may eventually be incorporated or adapted to future doctrine
modifications, PDD's do not necessarily constitute doctrine. Owing to PDD's political
sensitivity and limited dissemination, the majority of military forces often remain
unaware of their contents. Joint and service doctrinal publications are used exclusively to
Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, VA Doctrine Division. Online at
[http://www.doctrine.quantico.usmc.mil].
46
U.S., Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, (Washington D.C.:
Government Printing Office, November 1997). Online at [http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ns00097.pdfj.
47 Hans Kristensen, "Nuclear Futures: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and US
Nuclear Strategy," Basic Publications, Research Report 98.2, (March 1998).
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determine the applicability of existing doctrine to meet current counterproliferation
strategies, because doctrine indicates how U.S. forces train to conduct military
operations.
Counterproliferation operations employing military force can occur in a variety of
settings involving numerous operational concepts and schemes of maneuver. Ranging
from conventional air strikes combined with cruise missiles such as those employed
during Operation Desert Fox, to relying purely on long-range cruise missile attacks as
demonstrated during Operation Infinite Reach in Afghanistan and the Sudan,
counterproliferation operations can take many different forms. While this fact illustrates
U.S. reliance on a type of flexible-response strategy towards countering the proliferation
of WMD, it says nothing about how the United States might respond to a WMD threat in
a MOOTW environment.
A substantial portion of the U.S. military's joint and service doctrine contains
warfighting tactics, techniques, and procedures that can be easily adapted to meet
counterproliferation operations. But counterproliferation operations in a MOOTW
setting invoke particular concerns that should be considered. For instance, how would
the United States respond to a WMD threat in the conduct of a typical MOOTW mission
such as a Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO)?
Joint Publication 3-07 Military Operations Other Than War contains information
pertaining to NEOs. As the military service most often assigned NEOs owing to its
forward presence and immediate response capability, U.S. Marine Corps doctrine on
NEOs has been thoroughly developed, evaluated, and refined. Surprisingly, neither JP 3-
07 nor Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33 MOOTW, the Marine Corps NEO
35
doctrinal publication, contains any information pertaining to countering a WMD threat in
a NEO setting.
Examinations of JP 3-07 and other service doctrine associated with MOOTW
follow a similar pattern. Despite repeated statements asserting that the proliferation of
WMD represents the greatest threat to U.S. national security interests, joint and service
doctrine fail to reflect this threat assessment. This seems odd, given the accelerating rate
of MOOTW, particularly when coupled with current global trends in WMD proliferation.
Aside from the previously cited PDD, it becomes immediately clear that a chasm exists
between national threat assessments and military priorities as they pertain to U.S.
counterproliferation measures.
What is needed is a comprehensive review of MOOTW doctrine and the
subsequent inclusions of counterproliferation strategies. If the United States is serious
about utilizing military force as an option in its counterproliferation strategy (as
evidenced in the CPI) it must first ensure its military force is trained, equipped, and
prepared for confronting this new challenge. A first step is updating its military doctrine.
2. Force Capabilities and Limitations
While the United States enjoys a conventional military force superiority over
other likely opponents, it is highly vulnerable to what has been termed as asymmetric
threats, which include weapons of mass destruction. Despite the emphasis placed on
developing passive defense measures as a core component of the Counter Proliferation
Initiative, the U.S. military remains badly prepared to meet this growing challenge
presented by WMD proliferation. Should the U.S. military be called upon to conduct
36-
counterproliferation operations, it must first be prepared to operate in a WMD
environment.
Robert Joseph has defined four core challenges confronting the U.S. military
force structure's ability to respond to a WMD threat. First, it must be understood that in
the post-Cold War environment, states are less constrained to pursue their own aggressive
political, ideological, and religious objectives through the use of force. Nuclear,
biological, and chemical weapons are seen as "weapons of the weak against the strong"
and as the only means by which a state can confront or overcome the conventional
superiority of the strong.
48
The evidence indicating increasing WMD proliferation
highlights this fact. U.S. officials must recognize the threat posed by WMD proliferation
and realize that in future military engagements WMD-capable states might be inclined to
employ weapons of mass destruction.
Second, the effects of chemical and biological weapons on operating forces are
poorly understood.
49
It is difficult to develop accurate doctrine for conducting operations
in a WMD environment due to the variations and lethality of these types of weapons.
While the physical effects on individual soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines may be
mitigated through such passive defensive measures as Mission Oriented Protective
Posture (MOPP) gear and detection and sensor equipment, the psychological effects are
more difficult to estimate. Additionally, the effects of NBC attacks on points of
48
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debarkation/embarkation in regional theaters can have a tremendous impact on selected
concepts of operations and schemes of maneuver.50
The third challenge is to train and educate military forces. 51 Joseph states that
military training is perhaps the most critical requirement for deterring WMD use.
Additionally, should deterrence fail, fully trained military forces are necessary to conduct
operations in a NBC environment.52 Currently, most military training exercises lack an
integrated approach to incorporating nuclear, biological, or chemical events. If military
forces are to "train as to how they will fight," there is clearly a need to integrate operating
in aWMD environment to daily training regimens.
The fourth challenge lies in designing and equipping the military force to respond
to the WMD threat. Some progress has been made in this area, particularly with ensuring
that all forces are fully equipped with MOPP gear and are properly trained in its use. For
prolonged or continuous periods, MOPP gear severely impacts individual proficiency
while lowering overall combat effectiveness. 53 Continued improvements in individual
protective gear, decontamination equipment and procedures, NBC sensor and detection
devices, as well as other passive and active defensive measures are necessary to confront
the growing challenges posed by WMD proliferation.
1996), 156.
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3. Preventive/Preemptive Operations
Barry Schneider states that there are two kinds of offensive U.S. counterforce
(preemptive) operations to counter the threat posed by an adversary's WMD
capabilities.
54 The first is the use of offensive forces against an enemy's WMD assets in
wartime. Examples of this type of counterforce operations occurred against Nazi
Germany during World War II and against Iraq during Operations Desert Shield/Desert
Storm in 1991. The second type of counterforce operation is anticipatory self-defense.
In this case offensive forces are employed in a crisis where war seems inevitable and
enemy use of WMD is likely. This situation can be demonstrated in Israel's 1981 attack
on the Iraqi Osirak reactor. In both types of offensive counterforce operations, "the
object is to interdict, disrupt, seize, disable, neutralize, deny, or destroy enemy NBC and
missile assets."
55
Furthermore, the object is to prevent enemy WMD use against U.S.
forces and interests.
The ability of U.S. military forces to conduct preventive/preemptive operations is
closely associated with international law. History has witnessed the precedent of
preemptive attacks when countering proliferation. Israel's 1981 attack on Iraq's Osirak
nuclear reactor, America's Operation Desert Fox in 1998 against remaining Iraqi WMD
sites, and most recently during Operation Infinite Reach where the United States attacked
a suspected chemical weapons facility in the Sudan all involved a form of preemptive
counterforce military offensives. These attacks prompted a relatively restrained
international response, despite appearances that the United States was violating
international laws protecting sovereignty. The theory that preemptive attacks can be
54




justified based on the presence of an immediate danger or threat is central in opting to use
force in U.S. counterproliferation strategy.
Due to the typically covert nature of WMD proliferation and the challenges
placed on U.S. intelligence infrastructures, once decided upon, military operations must
include surprise, precision, and overwhelming destructiveness to achieve their success.
Preemption invokes numerous consequences. Any attempt to legitimize preemptive
military attacks most likely will be established within the provisions of United Nations
mandates and must provide recognizable evidence of the existence of a credible and
imminent threat.
The overall failure to locate and destroy Iraqi missile sites during Operations
Desert Shield/Desert Storm as revealed by post-war inspections suggest that much
progress needs to be made before U.S. policymakers can feel confident that a preemptive
military attack will succeed. The employment of long range conventional cruise missiles
seem to be increasing as a way to project power while reducing the risks to U.S. military
personnel. Employed along with aircraft attacks during Operation Desert Fox against
Iraq in 1998, Tomahawk cruise missiles were used exclusively in the attack on
Afghanistan terrorists and the Sudanese pharmaceutical plant. The high expense and
limited inventory of cruise missiles place considerable constraints on their employment,
forcing alternative concepts of operations.
4. Power Projection and Force Protection
Assurances of power projection and force protection will affect most decisions to
employ U.S. military forces. Critical to U.S. security interests is the ability to project
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power globally. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction threatens this ability to
project power. As demonstrated by the recent American embassy bombings in Kenya
and Tanzania, U.S. interests are vulnerable. To protect those interests, the United States
must retain the ability to project its military power unencumbered.
41-
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
-42
V. POTENTIAL APPLICATIONS OF U.S.
COUNTERPROLIFERATION STRATEGY AND MILITARY
OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR
A. INTRODUCTION
This section focuses on the issue of U.S. military power projection and force
protection capabilities when faced with a WMD threat. As military operations other than
war (MOOTW) continue to be a standard role and responsibility of the U.S. military, the
confluence ofMOOTW and counterproliferation operations is evident.
Greg Weaver and J. David Glaes argue that American military strategy "is based
on the ability to project major U.S. combat forces rapidly and effectively."56 The
proliferation of WMD greatly threatens this strategy. Any failure to project power while
ensuring a confident degree of force protection threatens vital U.S. national interests.
Weaver and Glaes contend that current U.S. warfighting doctrine with its emphasis on
mass forces and reliance upon access to theater airfields and ports, creates a potentially
decisive vulnerability that can be readily exploited by willing adversaries equipped with
weapons of mass destruction. Regional aggressors could employ chemical and/or
biological weapons to "great advantage... results would be devastating."5 '
Additionally, MOOTW operations themselves may solely involve a
counterproliferation operation intended to destroy a suspected or identified WMD target.
A number of questions must be answered, should American decision-makers remain
56 Greg Weaver and J. David Glaes. Inviting Disaster: How Weapons ofMass Destruction
Undermine U.S. Strategy for Projecting Military Power, (Virginia: AMCODA Press, 1997), 53.
57
John M. Collins, Weapons ofMass Destruction: The Impact of Proliferation on U.S. Military
Posture, Congressional Research Service (Washington D.C.: Library of Congress, June 2, 1995), 27.
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optimistic towards countering the proliferation of WMD, as well as preserving U.S.
power projection and force protection capabilities.
B. MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR (MOOTW)
Military operations other than war broadly encompass the use of military
capabilities across the range of military operations short of war.58 MOOTW focus on
deterring war, resolving conflict, promoting peace, and supporting civil authorities.
Typically, MOOTW may involve elements of both combat and non-combat operations in
a multitude of environmental settings. For example, the U.S. Marine Corps has
incorporated numerous tenets of MOOTW in current doctrine. Specifically, Marine
Corps doctrine and warfighting theory has developed the term "Three-Block War," which
signifies the importance of Marine Corps units maintaining the ability to function in the
uncertain MOOTW environment. The "Three-Block War" theory is based on the idea of
promoting peace by conducting peacekeeping operations, providing humanitarian
assistance, and when necessary immediately transition to combat operations in a given
contingency.
This concept of a "Three-Block War" is difficult to implement, but illustrates the
growing complexity of military operations other than war. Exacerbating the murky
distinction of combat versus non-combat operations in MOOTW, is the growing threat
that WMD will somehow be employed during a MOOTW contingency. As U.S. military
forces conducting MOOTW are ordered into many of the same regions that contain
Joint Pub 3-07: Joint Doctrine For Military Operations Other Than War (Government Printing
Office, 16 June 1995), 1-1.
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nations that are known or suspected of possessing a weapon of mass destruction,
contingency preparedness is crucial for mission accomplishment and force protection.
Table 2 depicts the major U.S. military operations other than war conducted since
Desert Shield/Storm in 1991, excluding counterdrug operations, defined by the number of
U.S. military forces involved. A total of 1 19 separate MOOTW missions were conducted
during the last nine-year period, again excluding sixteen different counterdrug operations.
Many of these missions were concurrent, thereby placing further demands on an already
extended force structure.
Table 2 also indicates the many types of MOOTW conducted during the period.
Twelve non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) were undertaken, primarily
evacuating and providing safe haven for American citizens living and working abroad as
well as many third-country national citizens requesting evacuation. Typically, NEOs
originate in or near American embassies, which suggest that American embassies tend to
focus attention and serve as prime targets for terrorists, non-state actors, and other anti-
American dissenters. Considering the embassies' relative vulnerability to conventional
threats, they are especially susceptible to WMD targeting, which should gain the
appropriate attention from U.S. military forces expected to conduct this type of
MOOTW.
45-
Table 2. U.S. Military Operations Other Than War Conducted Since Operation Desert
Shield/Desert Storm, Excluding Counterdrug Operations. Source: Online at
[http ://www.fas.org/man/dod- 101 /ops/index.html]
.
DATE OPERATION TYPE LOCATION
June 99-TBD Joint Guardian PO Kosovo
Mar-Jim 99 Allied Force P0/HA Kosovo
Oct 98-Mar 99 Noble Anvil PO Kosovo
Dec 98 Desert Fox S/AC Iraq
91-TBD Southern Watch EEZ SW Asia/Iraq
91-TBD Northern Watch EEZ Iraq
Apr 91 -Dec 94 Provide Comfort HA/EEZ Kurdistan
Sept-Nov 99 Stabilize PO Timor
Aug-Sept 99 Avid Response HA Turkey
Oct 98-Feb 99 Strong Support HA Central America
Aug 98 Infinite Reach CT/AC Sudan/Afghanistan
Jun98 Shepherd Venture NA Guinea-Bissau
Jun98 (none) NE0 Eritrea
Jan-Mar 98 Noble Response HA Kenya
Jul 97 Bevel Edge NE0 Cambodia
May-Jun 97 Noble Obelisk NE0 Sierra Leone
Mar-Jun 97 Guardian Retrieval NE0 Congo
Mar 97 Silver Wake NE0 Albania
Mar-Aug 96 Guardian Assistance HA Zaire/Rwanda/Uganda
May-Aug 96 Quick Response NEO Central African Republic
Apr-Aug 96 Assured Response NEO Liberia
Dec 95-May 96 Zorro II MSCA Mexico
Jul 95-Mar 96 3 ,d Taiwan Straits Crisis SF Taiwan Strait
95-June 99 Safe Border NA Peru-Ecuador
Jan-Mar 95 United Shield PO Somalia
Sep 94-Mar 95 Uphold Democracy PO/NA Haiti
Jul-Sep 94 Support Hope HA Rwanda
Apr 94 Distant Runner NEO Rwanda
Oct 92 (none) NEO Liberia
Aug 92-Dec 93 Restore Hope PO/HA Somalia
Aug-Oct 92 Provide Transition NA Angola
May 92 Garden Plot MSCA Los Angeles, CA
May 92 Silver Anvil NEO Sierra Leone
Sept 91 Victor Squared NEO Haiti
June 91 Fiery Vigil NEO Philippines




EEZ: Enforcement of Exclusion
Zones
HA: Humanitarian Assistance






SF: Show of Force Operations
S: Strikes and Raids
Following the NEOs, peacekeeping operations are the next most prevalent type of
MOOTW, but actually account for a higher number of troops involved. Additionally,
peacekeeping operations tend to endure for extended periods of time. For example, U.S.
military forces have been involved in MOOTW in the Balkan region beginning with
Operation Provide Promise in Bosnia in July 1992 and are currently deployed throughout
the Balkans participating in six on-going operations. Figure 2 is another illustration of
U.S. military operations other than war conducted since Desert Shield/Desert Storm in
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1991. The sustained international employment of U.S. military forces operating in the
MOOTW environment suggests a broadening U.S. interest in regional crises.
Figure 2. Number of U.S. Military Operations Other Than War Conducted
Since Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm in 1991
92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 2000
Year
If this operational tempo continues, U.S. military forces will eventually confront some
type ofWMD use in a MOOTW operation.
C. MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR AND THE
COUNTER PROLIFERATION INITIATIVE
As Military Operations Other than War and WMD proliferation become
increasingly prevalent, the likelihood of a direct confrontation between these phenomena
also increases. While the Counter Proliferation Initiative was intended to offer additional
policy alternatives for confronting the challenges posed by WMD proliferation, thus far
its most salient contribution has been towards recognizing the immediacy in preparing
U.S. military forces for operating in a nuclear, biological, or chemical environment.
Despite some technological advancements in various passive defense measures, much
work remains to be done.
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The continued proliferation of weapons of mass destruction signifies a dangerous
trend that can produce several consequences for U.S. national strategy involving force
projection. A significant element of U.S. national strategy is the ability to maintain
forward presence. Military Operations Other than War often signify the U.S.
commitment to a strategy of engagement. Weapons of mass destruction threaten this
strategy by posing risks that may become unacceptable, thereby forcing a reassessment of
the American desire to maintain an active and leading role in world affairs.
A comparison of Figure 3 and the appendices reveal a merging confluence of
WMD proliferation and U.S. MOOTW. If the past decade of MOOTW can be
considered a validation of U.S. national security concerns, then the United States has
virtually unconstrained global interests. Military involvement in regional MOOTW
contingencies have ranged from extended peacekeeping duties in the Former Yugoslavia
to humanitarian assistance operations in South Asia and to non-combatant evacuation
operations throughout Africa and the Adriatic.
Figure 3 illustrates the past decade of U.S. involvement in MOOTW. The
appendices denote countries that are known or suspected of containing one or more forms
of WMD according to open unclassified sources. Considering the extent of Iraq's WMD
programs as revealed during post-Gulf War inspections, it is entirely possible that a
number of other countries may be pursuing or have acquired one or more forms ofWMD,
particularly chemical or biological weapons. The Counter Proliferation Initiative was
designed to confront this challenge and augment on-going non-proliferation efforts.
Despite the non-proliferation obstacles and other disincentives that face WMD aspirants,














Weapons of mass destruction will likely be an integral aspect of future military
engagements. As outlined in the CPI, the United States must immediately begin to make
the necessary preparations in ensuring that its military forces are ready to face the WMD
threat. Military Operations Other than War offer the United States a powerful instrument
for maintaining a forward presence, but can also create a serious vulnerability if forces
are placed in harm's way without the proper training, equipment, and level of
preparedness.
D. U.S. MILITARY PREPAREDNESS
Counterproliferation measures offer an alternative approach to stemming the
proliferation of WMD. As noted authors have pointed out, it would be naive and myopic
to conclude that military options can be expected to achieve 100 percent success in every
case where diplomacy has failed. But the employment of military force towards
counterproliferation does provide a more flexible response, whether through deterrence,
coercive diplomacy, or actual application of force. Should U.S. decision makers choose
to apply military force in pursuit of counterproliferation objectives, the military's organic
capabilities and limitations must also be reviewed in addition to considering potential
international responses, legal and moral ramifications, and other factors previously
discussed.
The fact that U.S. military forces involved in MOOTW are equipped with the bare
essentials for operating in a NBC environment should be alarming. Relying primarily on
individual protective garments (MOPP gear), limited detection equipment, and the most
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basic of preparedness training, U.S. forces seem relatively unprepared for confronting a
WMD-armed adversary.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In January 1997 Secretary of Defense Cohen summarized the principle threat to
U.S. national security interests:
59
I believe the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction presents the greatest
threat that the world has ever known. We are finding more and more countries
who are acquiring technology - not only missile technology — and are
developing chemical weapons and biological weapons capabilities to be used
in theater and also on a long-range basis. So I think that is perhaps the greatest
threat any of us will face in the coming years.
Secretary Cohen's statements directly reflect the seriousness of the increasing
proliferation of WMD as well as illustrate the importance of confronting this impending
challenge to U.S. national security interests. The development and employment of a
comprehensive counterproliferation strategy is key to responding to this threat. Since
there is no simple solution or single response to the threat posed by the proliferation of
WMD and their delivery systems, a flexible response is likely to continue to be the
hallmark of U.S. counterproliferation strategy.
U.S. participation in Military Operations Other Than War is likely to continue on
its present course. The evidence presented in this thesis indicates that in the very near
future, U.S military forces will be directly confronted with a WMD threat in a MOOTW
setting. How effectively the U.S. military will resolve this impending crisis remains
unanswered. But as U.S. military forces continue to go into harms way during
peacekeeping, humanitarian, non-combatant evacuation, and other operations other than
war, the WMD threat will surely increase risks and present greater challenges to mission
59
U.S., Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, (Washington D.C.:
Government Printing Office, November 1997). Online at [http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ns00097.pdf].
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accomplishment. If the United States is to continue to enjoy its relative freedom to
project power and protect its forces, the WMD threat must be neutralized through the
consistent and alacritous application of its counterproliferation strategy.
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APPENDIX
GLOBAL NUCLEAR WEAPON POSSESSION AND
POTENTIAL PROLIFERATION
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Source: Robert W. Chandler, The New Face of War (McLean,
VA: AMCODA Press, 1998), 84.
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